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Abstract 
 
The dissertation consists of two chapters on measuring firms technological profile. Patent data can 
be grouped into two primary generations. The first generation lead by the work of Schmookler 
(1966), Scherer (1982), and Griliches (1984), and the second generation led by Trajtenberg, Jaffe, 
and Henderson (1997) and Kogan et al. (2016). When combined, both generations data spans from 
nearly 1926-2010 and has made a meaningful impact on innovation research. In the first chapter, 
I propose a third generation of patent data. The third generation of patent data has two distinct 
contributions. First, it extends patent-firm ownership information beyond 2010 to 2016. The new 
dataset uses the established connections of previous datasets and builds on that information with 
additional data on firm names gathered from EDGAR. Second, it takes advantage of the 
information contained in the text of patents using text analysis. Using text analysis allows for 
greater flexibility over traditional measures. The second chapter investigates how ownership 
structure affects firm value. The previous literature has assumed more innovation is better, 
meaning the more innovation a business creates; the better off it is in the long-run. However, not 
all innovations are created equal. We contribute to the literature by investigating how institutional 
investors change future innovation, not in quantity, but diversity. Using several unique measures 
of technological diversification created from firm-level patent data, we show that institutional 
investors increase the focus on a firm’s future innovation. Our results are robust to the 
classification scheme. Ultimately, our results indicate institutional investors create value by 
encouraging firms to build on prior knowledge. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Innovation; Corporate Finance; Text Analysis; Ownership Structure; Institutional 
Investors 
 
 
1 Chapter 1: Generality, Originality and Firm Value: A Text Based Approach. 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the ability of textual content to classify patents as “general” or “original.” 
We introduce a new measure of patent generality and originality that takes advantage of the 
information content of the text contained in patents. Our new measure captures two features not 
previously grasped by similar measures, such as that of Jaffe and Henderson (1997). First, our 
measure accounts for the distance between technological classes. Second, our measure has the 
ability to capture the similarity of patents within classes. Lastly, we introduce a revised dataset of 
firm level patent information that extends previous datasets. 
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1.1  Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to create and describe an improved dataset based on U.S. patents. The 
dataset provides researchers an expanded perspective on firm innovation that can be used widely 
for research. Prior data on U.S. patents has become outdated, and researchers are identifying 
limitations. This paper seeks to overcome those limitations by improving upon the prior datasets. 
The three primary contributions of this paper are; an updated link between patents and firm owners, 
a new measure of patent originality based on the patent text, and a widely accessible dataset for 
use in research. 
Patent count as a measure of innovation has captured the imagination of finance and economics 
researchers because of its unique features. A patent holder has exclusive rights to seek a return on 
investment; no other firm can produce its product. This exclusive right incentivizes firms to report 
innovation through patents, further strengthening the argument for patents as a measure of 
innovation.  
In the corporate finance literature, patents proxy for an indirect measure of innovation. However, 
researchers find patents a more reliable indicator of firm-level innovation than R&D expenditures. 
To take advantage of the informational content delivered by patents, researchers have transformed 
patent data into firm-level innovation datasets. These datasets can be classified into two distinct 
categories: Generation One marked by simple patent counts of firms that were hand collected, and 
the most recent Generation Two marked by citation weighted patent counts and a more reliable 
firm-patent connection. 
Generation Two adds value to the patent data transforming the data to create new measures. 
Specifically “generality” and “originality,” as introduced by Trajtenberg, Jaffe, and Henderson 
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(1997) are created from the link between patent citations. These measures, along with others, have 
made a significant contribution to the literature. However, more recently, researchers have 
identified several weaknesses that plague the interpretation as well as the reliability of this 
measure. For example, “generality” and “originality” rely on heterogeneous technological 
classifications that are subject to evolution over time. We introduce a new measure of patent 
generality and originality that takes advantage of the information content of the text contained in 
patents. This new measure does not rely on patent classification schemes, nor is it affected by 
changing technology over time. 
Trajtenberg (1990) introduced the use of weighted citations as a measure of economic value, 
arguing that patents cited by innovations in various asset classes have greater “generality.” Citation 
weighted measures are more reliable, as they better represent innovation output, whereas a simple 
patent count represents input. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) find weighted citation measures 
to be more correlated with firm value than patent counts. 
To improve upon Jaffe and Henderson’s (1997) measure of “generality” and “originality,” we use 
the textual information contained in patent documents. These measures rely on the simple 
assumption that similar patents use similar language. Because our measure does not rely on the 
classification of technological classes by the US patent office, it has two distinct advantages in 
comparison to Jaffe and Henderson’s (1997) measure. First, our measure accounts for the distance 
between technological classes. Second, our measure has the ability to capture the similarity of 
patents within classes. 
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In the next section, we investigate the data available for patent researchers. Next, we proceed with 
a review of patent and text analysis literature, as well as its growing importance in finance. We 
then proceed to review the methodology used to create our measure of generality as well as our 
extended patent-ownership dataset. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our measure by 
demonstrating its ability to explain the similarity between technological classes as well as within 
the class. 
1.2 Patents as a Data Source 
The use of patents as a data source is not new. Patents have long been identified as an important 
data source for measuring innovation impact, as indicated by the several researchers committed to 
creating, expanding, and maintaining patent datasets including Griliches (1984); Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001); Kogan, et al. (2016); Li, et al. (2014) among others.  
The reliable use of patents as a proxy for innovation grew from the unreliability of R&D 
expenditures. R&D is considered unreliable for several reasons. Those highlighted in Lerner and 
Seru (2015) include the issue firstly that firms only need report R&D if expenditures are material. 
This can lead to uncertainty and heterogeneous reports across firms and industry because the 
definition of material is left to interpretation by the parent firm. Secondly, R&D expenditures are 
not broken down by product line. Lastly, patents, as the product of a firm’s R&D, are more 
representative of innovation output than input. Beyond the nature of R&D reporting, the integrity 
of the data can also be unreliable. 
Patents as a data source can be grouped into two distinct generations as we discuss in the 
forthcoming section. Generation One relied upon simple patent count. Therefore, the data used by 
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early patent researchers only used the names on patents and the quantity assigned to each firm. 
Later, in the second generation, researchers begin to take advantage of additional information, such 
as citation, patent class, among others. The improvements between generations can be broadly 
summarized by taking advantage of the additional information contained in the patent. In the next 
section, we describe in the process firms to be awarded a patent, as well as the information 
provided in a patent. 
1.2.1  The Patent Award Process and the Information They Contain  
Nearly all firms and industries hold patents. There are three different types of patents. Utility, 
Design, and Plant patents. As prior studies have, this study will focus on the Utility patent. The 
USPTO describes the Utility Patent as “[a] new and useful process, machine, article of 
manufacture, or compositions of matters, or any new useful improvement thereof.”  
A Utility patent has several key sections. The sections this study focuses on include: The Patent 
Number, Application Date, Award Date, Inventor, Assignee, References Cited, Abstract, Claims, 
and Description. Each patent has an Inventor, the individual whom files the patent, while many 
(but not all) have an Assignee, the firm or individual which the intellectual property belongs1. 
Citations, play a crucial role in determining the impact of innovations, as indicated by the earlier 
research. These citations play a critical legal role, as they define the scope of an invention as well 
as having possible legal implications in the future. Alcacer and Gittelman (2006) find that more 
than 60% of citations are selected by examiners. Patents that cite other patents in a broader array 
of technology classes are often viewed as having more “originality.” Patents that are themselves 
                                                 
1 A detailed description of the sections in a Utility patent may be found at https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-
started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/nonprovisional-utility-patent#heading-18 . 
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cited by a more technologically dispersed array of patents are viewed as having greater 
“generality.” In the following section, we create a measure of originality and generality that uses 
text analysis to circumvent the need for technology classes. This study focuses on the inclusion of 
the data contained in the Abstract, Claims, and Description sections.  
Patent applications submitted to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) consist of claims 
and other supporting documentation. Patent applications have three primary targets for text 
analysis; Abstract, Claims, and Description. Both the Abstract and Description give broad 
descriptions of the individual intellectual property claim. Where the section, Claim describes in 
detail precisely what process, material, or other is being claimed. Some of the claims in a patent 
application will be cast in concrete terms; others may be sweeping. 
1.3 Literature Review 
The use of patent data in finance began with the early work by Schmookler (1966), Scherer (1982), 
and Griliches (1984). This literature was groundbreaking, as it began the use of citation counts as 
a proxy for industry and firm innovation activity. However, researchers soon began to realize that 
the drawback of simple patent citation counts was two-fold; first, simple citation count was unable 
to capture the extreme heterogeneity displayed by true innovation value. Second, simple citation 
counts are only a fraction of the total information available in patent documents, according to 
Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1987). 
These drawbacks lead to the development of new measures, such as the weighted citation measure 
of Trajtenberg (1990). The weighted citation measure was developed to specifically address the 
problem of heterogeneous patent and citation activity across industry. Trajtenberg shows how 
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referenced citation counts can proxy for the importance of a patent in a specific technology field, 
or with alterations, counts can capture technology spillover. 
To further expand the usefulness of information contained in patent data Trajtenberg, Jaffe and 
Henderson (1997) created measures of “generality” and “originality.” These two new measures 
were created with the intention of further capturing the importance of innovation on a patent and 
firm level. For example, Jaffe and Henderson define generality as: 
(1) 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦௧ =  1 − ෍ 𝑠௜௝ଶ
௡೔
௝
 
Where 𝑠௜௝ଶ  is the squared percentage of citations received by patent i that belong to patent class j, 
out of 𝑛௜ asset classes. This measure is known as a forward-looking measure, as it considers the 
impact of the patent post-filing date. Jaffe and Henderson’s measure for originality is defined 
similar to Equation 1, however, it is a backwards-looking measure that takes into account citations 
made by the target patent. 
Both measures drive and inspire a diverse set of literature in corporate finance. Bernstein (2015) 
uses both measures to show how public firm innovation becomes less novel after IPO, but that 
firms begin to acquire innovation rather than create it. Acharya and Xu (2016) investigate the 
relation between innovation and a firm’s financial dependence using a sample of privately held 
and publicly traded US firms. Amore, Cedric, and Zaldokas (2013) investigate the impact of 
interstate banking deregulation on innovation activity, where they find that interstate banking 
deregulation has had a significant, positive effect on the originality of patents. 
Our methodology is not unlike the early work of Scherer (1982), who develops and uses a 
classification scheme by manually analyzing patent text and creating a technology flow matrix. 
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However, in contrast to Scherer (1982), we use a computerized algorithm to compute backward 
(originality) and forward (generality) similarity measure using text analysis. Our new measure of 
forward and backward similarity does not rely on changing the definition/the changing definitions 
of technology sector and accounts for heterogeneous distances between sectors, unlike the measure 
proposed by Trajtenberg, Jaffe and Henderson (1997). 
The use of text analysis in financial economics can be found in an extensive survey by Loughran 
and McDonald (2016). In short, it is the process of converting the informational content contained 
in text to quantitative data. Researchers have used text analysis to investigate asset returns, such 
as Frazier et al. (1984), Antweiler and Frank (2004), Das and Chen (2007), Tetlock (2007), and Li 
(2008), readability Jones and Shoemaker (1994) and Li (2008), and industry groupings Hoberg 
and Phillips (2010). 
Li (2008) connects the readability of a firm’s financial reports to that firm’s performance. This 
paper measures the FOG index, a measure of readability, of a firm’s financial reports. The author 
finds financial reports with more complex language belong to firms with lower profitability ratios, 
as compared to firms with more simple reports and higher returns. 
The most closely related paper to our research is that of Hoberg and Phillips (2010). The authors 
segment firms by product markets, based on key-words in the business description section of their 
10-K filings. We propose that our measure of originality also captures the spirit of Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010). Patents represent real options of future product creation activity, so firms that hold 
a diverse set of patents hold a diversified set of real options. For example, differentiation in product 
markets produces less volatile cash flows, and reduces firms’ risk and expected returns (Hou and 
Robinson (2006)). 
9 
 
1.4 Methodology and Data 
1.4.1 Patent Similarity 
Our new measure of patent generality addresses a complication of patent data as raised by Lerner 
and Seru (2015), namely, “the failure to adjust for the technological class of the discovery.” The 
USTPO currently hosts approximately 475 total classes and 165,000 total subclasses. The 
technology of each industry and class evolves over time, as can be seen using the text analysis 
application by Packalen and Bhattacharya (2012). However, its classification remains the same. 
This complication proves particularly challenging when considering how weighted patent counts 
are constructed. For example, consider Trajtenberg’s (1990) simple linear weighted patent count 
measure: 
 
(2) 𝑊𝑃𝐶௧ =  ෍(1 + 𝐶௜)
௡೟
௜ୀଵ
 
 
Where n is the total number of patents issued during year t in one specific product class. Because 
of the ever-changing nature of technology, using this measure across decades becomes 
challenging. 
To alleviate this complication, we introduce a simple linear measure of likeness that can be used 
to measure a patent’s generality and originality.  
To compute a new text-based measure of patent similarity, we use text analysis as a technique 
aimed at converting text data into qualitative data that can be more easily used by the researcher. 
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First, we gather the full text of all U.S. utility patents granted from 1926 to 2010 from the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). All patent information gathered is publicly available 
information and contained in the USPTO’s bulk data files2. While data is available from 1975 or 
earlier, the text is scanned using an Optical character recognition process and is extremely 
unreliable and unstructured. Previous researchers have used data pre-1975, such as Packalen and 
Bhattacharya (2012). Our sample comprises 4,131,597 patents spanning 1976 thru 2010. 
Once all patent text is gathered, it is processed, filtered through extensive cleaning processes, and 
converted into tokenized text. The tokenized text is the process of converting documents (patents) 
into word vectors and stripped of all punctuation. For example, the simple sentence “Mary had a 
little lamb.” would be converted into the following tokenized text. 
 
(3) [Mary, had, a little, lamb] 
 
We then further select words and phrases made up of only noncapitalized English nouns, and we 
remove all words lacking information content, called stop words. Stop words are devoid of any 
informational material (such as: and, it, or) and therefore contribute very little to the understanding 
of similarities between two documents. Revisiting the example (3), the final output would now 
look like (4) 
(4) [little, lamb] 
 
                                                 
2 https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/bulk-data-products  
11 
 
We then further remove patents containing less than 20 unique words because patents that contain 
less may not have sufficient content to justify similarity. 
Once the text is cleaned, it is then converted into vectors, where each word receives a count for its 
frequency of use in each document. Each vector is then normalized to unit length; then the cosign 
similarity is calculated from the dot product of two vectors: 
 
(4) 𝑆𝐼𝑀௜,௝ =  𝑉௜ ∙ 𝑉௝
ᇱ 
Where 𝑉௜ represents the term frequency normalized vector for patent i and 𝑆𝐼𝑀௜,௝ is the cosign 
similarity between documents i and 𝑗. 
Cosign similarity is a measure of similarity between two vectors, as it measures the cosign of the 
angle between them. The resulting value bound by [1,-1] where 1, the two documents are the most 
similar and -1, the two documents are complements. Because we have created vectors using only 
positive counts of n-grams words, our cosign similarity is bound by [1,0]. 
To illustrate the final result, Figure 1 shows the mean similarity score for patent citations over 
time, as well as the number of citations that occur after a patent’s filing date. The number of 
citations after the filing date resembles a Poisson distribution curve. A Poisson type shape occurs 
because of truncation by the start of the sample--there is lag between filing and granting a patent 
that is currently between 2-5 years. 
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Figure 1-1: Mean Similarity for sample overtime (Forward Looking) 
 
 
Figure 1-2 displays the median similarity score for cited and citing patents, along with bands 
representing the 75 and 25 percentiles. The interquartile range decreases overtime each year, while 
the median follows a similar path of the mean, starting around .4, while slowly reducing to a steady 
state around .25. The results indicate that over time, patents tend to drift away regarding similarity. 
This highlights an issue with the traditional patent analysis because technology changes over time, 
but technological classes remain the same, there may be uncaptured variation in the similarity of 
patents within a technology class. 
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Figure 1-2: Median Similarity for sample overtime (Backward Looking) 
 
 
Both Figure 1-1 & 1-2 show the pairwise similarity shows meaningful results. Overtime patents 
lose their similarity to prior patents, supporting the need for eradicating stagnant patent classes. 
With pairwise correlations, we are able to investigate the similarity right away of patents over time. 
In section 1.4.3 we exploit the pairwise correlations to determine the likeness of a firm’s patent 
portfolio.  
1.4.2 Firm Ownership Information 
Matching firms to their owners is no simple task. Several problems arise when trying to discern 
the ownership of any specific patent. The literature of Kogan et al. (2016) and Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2001) have made substantial upgrades to the link between firms and their patents. 
Both groups have faced the same complications when matching firm names to patent owners. For 
example, some firm names have several variations. International Business Machines may be listed 
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in numerous ways, such as, IBM, Inter Business Machine, among others. Over time, more data has 
been gathered that can aid in the process of ownership matching. A contribution of this paper is to 
extend the traditional datasets.   
To connect patents to firms, we employ three well-established datasets as well as one additional 
source. First, we gather the developed firm-patent data sets provided by Kogan et al. (2016), and 
the NBER patent database of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). The Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(2001) dataset links patents to firms for the years 1976-2006. The Kogan et al. (2016) dataset links 
patent ownership to firms from 1926-2010. By combining the two datasets, we take advantage of 
the prior firm matching. To further identify patent owners, we use the ownership identification of 
Lai (2013). This dataset uses Bayesian methods to match similar names/owners across patents over 
time. 
The resulting dataset still has a maximum year of 2010. For researchers, extending the data beyond 
2010 should be a priority. Therefore, we employ a novel approach. Each publicly traded firm must 
list their subsidiaries in their 10-K annual filings, Exhibit 21 on EDGAR. Using the information 
on firm subsidiaries, we are able to extend the link between firms and patents beyond the year 
2010. Furthermore, the firm subsidiary information provides matches in years before 2010 that 
were not previously available.  
We index patents by their application year, as is standard in the literature. Once matching with our 
corpus, our sample consists of 948,881 cited patents and 2,187,103 citing patents for a total of 
3,135,984 patents. While we have several more patents available in our corpus, we limit the sample 
to those we can match to a cited patent assigned to a firm in Compustat. 
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1.4.3 New Variable Creation 
As discussed previously, the text of a patent contains valuable information relevant to a patents 
similarity. In section 1.4.1 we were able to compute the pairwise similarity of two patents. With 
this information, we will create a new measure of patent originality that solves some of the 
problems identified in the prior literature. Jaffe and Henderson define originality as: 
 
(5) Originality୲ =  1 − ෍ 𝑠௜௝ଶ
௡೔
௝
 
 
Where 𝑠௜௝ଶ  is the squared percentage of citations made by patent i that belong to patent class j, out 
of 𝑛௜ asset classe. This measure is known as a backward-looking measure. However, this measure 
has many weakness that may hamper its use in empirical research. First, the measure assumes the 
distance between each class is equal. For example, if the original patent related to construction 
equipment the measure gives the same weight for a citation in technology as it does the jewelry 
category. Under certain circumstances, the difference between those categories can be drastically 
different. Next, the measure is undefined when the patent awards no citations outside of its patent 
class. This weakness prevents the measure from being used for single industry or inter-industry 
studies. 
We propose a new measure based on the text of the patents. The measure is defined as follows: 
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(6) Text Originality୲ =  1 − ෍ 𝑝௝ ෍ 𝑠௜௝ଶ
௡೔
௜
௡ೕ
௝
 
 
Where 𝑠௜௝denotes the average cosign similarity for patent 𝑖's citations that belong to patent class 𝑗 
and, 𝑝௜௝ represents the proportion of citations for patent 𝑖's citations that belong to patent class 𝑗. 
The new measure based on text solves both problems discussed earlier. First, classes are weighted 
in similarity by 𝑝௝. Therefore, no longer are the distances between classes treated as equal, but 
rather they are a function of the average similarity between the two classes. Next, the new variable 
is defined for patents that only cite their own class. This allows us to capture variation previously 
not studied.  
The benefit of the new measure is depicted in Table 1-1. 
 
Table 1-1: Originality Summary Statistics 
 HJT Text Based 
Panel A.      
Mean (All) 0.52 0.31 
Std (All) 0.35 0.41 
   
Panel B.      
Mean (Single Cite) X 0.60 
Std (Single Cite) X 0.39 
 
Table 1-1 shows the summary statistics for both the HJT measure of originality as well as the text-
based measure of originality. In Panel A, we compute the mean and standard deviation of the 
originality measures. We can see that the text-based measure has a lower mean, but higher standard 
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deviation. This text based originality measure may be weighting citations within the class 
differently than the traditional HJT measure. Panel B results are most impactful. In this panel, we 
compute the mean and standard deviation of the originality measure for only patents that cite a 
single class. The HJT measure is undefined, meaning we are unable to use this measure to 
investigate single industry studies. However, we are able to compute the inter-class similarity using 
the text-based measure. This is because the text-based measure is relying on pairwise similarities 
as well as class similarities. Therefore, our measure does not become undefined if the patent only 
cites one class. A similar measure can be created for generality. 
After creating a similar measure for generality, we conduct a simple investigation of the properties 
of the new measure. Table 1-2 shows the underlying correlations between both the text-based 
originality measure and generality measure with essential financial variables. The inclusion of this 
correlation table is intended to give the reader an idea of the unconditional correlations between 
the new variable and standard variables used in an economic or financial analysis.  Generality and 
firm age are positively correlated; we think of firms in their later years as having more general 
innovations and stable cash flows. Originality and firm age are also negatively correlated; this too 
reconciles with the literature which suggests that young firms create innovative products to capture 
attention and market share. 
 
 
Table 1-2: Correlation Table 
 
 
Originality  Generality  
Tobin's 
Q 
Total 
Assets 
Market 
Value 
Book 
Value 
Book/ 
Market 
Firm 
Age 
         
Originality  
 
0.02* 0.08* -0.03* -0.05* -0.03* 0.01* 0.16* 
Generality  0.02* 
 
0.05* -0.05* -0.03* -0.07* -0.02* 0.1* 
Tobin's Q 0.08* 0.05* 
 
-0.09* 0.17* -0.02* -0.09* 0.33* 
Total Assets -0.03* -0.05* -0.09* 
 
0.59* 0.74* -0.01* -0.63* 
Market Value -0.05* -0.03* 0.17* 0.59* 
 
0.83* -0.05* -0.09* 
Book Value -0.03* -0.07* -0.02* 0.74* 0.83* 
 
0.1* -0.63* 
Book/Market 0.01* -0.02* -0.09* -0.01* -0.05* 0.1* 
 
0.02* 
Firm Age 0.16* 0.1* 0.33* -0.63* -0.09* -0.63* 0.02* 
 
Simple correlation between similarity measure and other variables. * represents .01 level of significance. 
 
 
1.5 Inter-industry study using a new originality measure 
To highlight the advantage of our new measure, to capture uniqueness in the same technology 
class, and to illustrate its effectiveness in capturing patent originality, we show its ability to predict 
abnormal returns. We gather FDA drug approval dates from FDA’s orange book3. This data 
contains approval dates for FDA approved drugs from 1981 onward. Included in the data is specific 
patent numbers associated with the product under review.  
We use a simple event study to show the value of the new measure. We highlight the application 
of our measure in pharmaceuticals because many drugs are categorized in the same category. First, 
we estimate the abnormal return and market reaction associated with FDA drug approval. For this 
estimation, we use CRSP value-weighted and equal weighted returns and the Scholes-Williams 
Market Model to estimate cumulative abnormal returns. We use [-60,20] for the estimation 
window and [-20,20] for the event window. Table 1-3 shows the result for equal weighted returns 
around several event windows, as well as Figure 1-3. The results show an overwhelmingly positive 
reaction following the announcement of a new drug, as to be expected. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Data and description can be found at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm129689.htm. 
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Table 1-3: CAARs using Scholes-Williams Market Model 
 CAAR T-Stat P-value 
[-1,1] 0.0141 4.85 0.00 
[-2,2] 0.0115 3.06 0.00 
[-3,3] 0.0104 2.34 0.02 
[0,1] 0.0128 5.41 0.00 
[0,2] 0.0106 3.66 0.00 
[0,3] 0.0087 2.59 0.01 
Results of Scholes-Williams CAAR regressions. Event times 
represent FDA approval of patented pharmaceutical products. 
Value weighted returns are used.  
 
 
Figure 1-3: CARR after FDA Approval of Patented Product 
 
 
We use the abnormal returns from Table 1-3 and regress them on our originality measure and 
several other control variables. We include firm and year-fixed effects, the results of which are 
shown in Table 1-4.  A negative sign on the coefficient for originality would indicate that more 
original patents cause a larger market reaction. 
0.00% 
0.50% 
1.00% 
1.50% 
2.00% 
2.50% 
-20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
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Table 1-4: Results from Regressing CARR on Originality 
 
 
(1 Value 
Weighted) (2 EQ Weight) 
 CARR[0,3] CARR[0,3] 
Originality 0.0485* 0.0285* 
 (0.024) (0.044) 
Backwards Citations 0.0002 0.0030 
 (0.922) (0.622) 
Log(at) 0.0119 0.0459 
 (1.477) (0.987) 
B/M -0.0711 -0.0312 
  (-1.229) (-1.239) 
Firm Effects Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
R-squared: 0.815 0.843 
Log-Likelihood: 487.63 497.23 
Result from regressing CARRs as estimated in table 1-4 on Originality, the 
patent originality variable as computed from formula 6, Backwards 
Citations, Log Total Assets, Book-to-Market. Each regression includes Firm 
and Year effects. T-statistics are provided in parenthesis. 
 
The results show that originality is associated with a larger market reaction, indicating that as a 
firm gets a more original product approved, it is associated with a larger market reaction. We do 
not propose that the full market reaction is explained by originality, but rather it is a demonstration 
of the capability of the originality measure. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Because patents are an important measure of innovation for firms, maintaining a functional patent 
dataset is important for future literature. Furthermore, we provide a new dataset that introduces a 
new measure of patent generality and originality that takes advantage of the information content 
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of the text contained in patents. Our new measure captures two features of the data not captured in 
Jaffe and Henderson (1997) - the distance between technological classes, and the similarity within 
classes. These two features make our measure more ideal for use, because it can detect 
heterogeneity of originality within industry as well as across it.  
Additionally, we extend the patent-ownership data nearly one additional decade from prior 
datasets. The addition of this time frame will allow researchers to investigate important events of 
the last decade, such as, the financial crisis. Our dataset is publicly available for research. 
To illustrate our originality measure’s effectiveness, we demonstrate its ability to explain abnormal 
returns from FDA drug approvals. One of the benefits of our new measure is capturing the variation 
in originality within one patent class. Previous measures were unable to capture this variation 
because they relied upon USPTO classifications. The measure shows how more original FDA 
drugs are associated with larger abnormal returns. 
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2 Chapter 2: Firm Innovation and Institutional Ownership 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Innovation is a primary driver of growth in both macroeconomics and microeconomics. For a firm, 
innovation is vital to the future growth prospects of the firm. The prior literature has assumed more 
innovation is better, meaning the more innovation a business creates; the better off it is in the long-
run. However, not all innovations are created equal. We contribute to the literature by investigating 
how institutional investors change future innovation, not in quantity, but diversity. Using several 
unique measures of technological diversification created from firm-level patent data, we show that 
institutional investors increase the focus on a firm’s future innovation. Our results are robust to the 
classification scheme. Ultimately, our results indicate institutional investors create value by 
encouraging firms to build on prior knowledge.   
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2.1 Introduction 
Innovation is a primary driver of growth in both macroeconomics and microeconomics. For a firm, 
innovation is vital to the future growth prospects of the firm. The prior literature has assumed more 
innovation is better, meaning the more innovation a business creates; the better off it is in the long-
run. As a result, a robust line of literature is dedicated to investigating the motivation of managers 
to increase innovation output (sources). However, not all innovations are created equal. Therefore, 
we contribute to the literature by investigating how the nature of innovation affects firm value. 
Using institutional ownership, our goal is to show that external shocks, such as intuitional 
ownership, not only increases the quantity of a firm innovation but also how it changes the 
technology portfolio of the firm's overall portfolio.  
Several features have been found to increase the future innovation output of a firm over time. For 
example, Institutional ownership is one feature shown to increase the future innovation production 
of business. Aghion et al. (2013) ask if institutional investors increase short-termism or if they 
allow managers to “swing for the fences?” They ultimately conclude managers are incentivized to 
produce more innovation. We ask the question, as a firm increases its innovation following 
investment by an institutional owner, do they also change the types of innovation they create. Just 
as firms can be segmented into sectors or industries, innovation can be related to specific 
industries.  
This paper investigates what types of innovation an institutional investor is incentivizing. For 
example, do the incentives offered by principles incentivize managers to innovate in a more 
focused manner, ultimately increasing firm value? To answer this question we use a rich and 
unique dataset of firm patent data collected from the USPTO. With this data, we provide the most 
28 
 
detailed investigation into the outcome of incentives offered to managers to innovate. We look not 
at the quantity or quality of the patents produced by the firm, but rather their ability to create 
focused, value-enhancing patents over time.  
First, we show there is a robust relationship between institutional ownership and future innovation 
in that institutional ownership increases the focus of a firm’s innovation over time. We create 
several unique measures of unrelated innovation defined in general as a patent that cannot be 
directly linked to a firm's prior innovation (either by class or citation). After controlling for 
industry and year fixed effects, we find a significant negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and unrelated patents. Our results hold both with levels of institutional ownership as 
well as changes in institutional ownership. Next, we further show the robustness of our results by 
employing Instrumental Variables regressions as well as alternative specifications of our primary 
findings. The results are not sensitive to the specification of the regression or the classification 
scheme used. Our evidence supports the conclusion that institutional owners motivate managers 
to produce higher quality and more impactful innovations over time.  
A firm’s technological diversification, as defined by the diversification of firm innovation has 
implications for firm value (Silverman (1999); Garcia-Vega (2006); Leten et al. (2007)). The 
literature finds diversification can be both bad (Leten et al. (2007)) and good (Silverman (1999); 
Leten et al. (2007)) for firms. We argue that the institutional investors, through increased 
monitoring and proper incentivizing, focus firm innovation efforts and subsequently increase firm 
value. Furthermore, by focusing on firm innovations, institutional investors increase firm value. 
Our research indicates this is a unique method by which institutional investors increase the value 
of the firm. 
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Our results provide both a unique perspective as well as support for several theories regarding 
institutional ownership. For example, our results are consistent with Aghion et al. (2013) in that 
institutional investors have a positive, measurable effect on firm innovation. Furthermore, our 
results seem to support the career concern hypothesis model (Holmstrom (1982); Aghion et 
al.(2013)). Managers dislike the inherent risk involved in innovation. In the case of misguided or 
failing innovation, managers risk losing their job. Therefore, when monitored closely (by 
institutional investors) they choose to not only innovate more, but they choose to innovate more 
efficiently.  
The paper is organized as follows; in Section 2, we survey the literature surrounding how 
ownership and management affect innovation. In Section 3, we provide a detailed description of 
the data and methodology of the study. We describe the variables used in this study in Section 4. 
Section 5 shows robust results indicating institutional ownership increases not only the quantity of 
innovation, but also the focus of future innovation. In Section 6, we conclude our study by 
discussing the implications of our results as well as the avenues for future research. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Innovation is a primary driver of growth in a firm. This fact has led to the popularity of researching 
how companies innovate and what factors that contributes to the firm’s ability to innovate. The 
focus of this study is the impact of agency problems on future innovation.  
Researchers have proposed several theories regarding the relationship between ownership and 
future innovation outcomes. Most have focused on the classic agency issue, or separation of 
interests between management and future innovation, introduced by Jensen & Meckling (1976). 
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Theoretical studies have modeled the potential agency relationship between owners and 
innovation.  
Owner-manager relationships can influence innovation and innovation growth in several ways. 
Some of the earliest principal-agent models begin with the work of Harris and Raviv (1978) and 
Holstrom (1979). These early models show the importance of proper incentives to motivate agents 
to act in the best interest of the principal. More recently, Manso (2011) models optimal incentives 
that motivate innovation, again highlighting the importance of proper incentives, monitoring, 
feedback, and a long-term perspective. Institutional investors are uniquely positioned to 
incentivize agents to promote innovation.  
Institutional investors have both the “carrot” and a “stick” in a sense they may both reward well-
preforming managers and punish poor performing managers. Career pressures, such as the demand 
for strong quarterly reports or the risk of termination cause managers to focus on the short term, 
institutional holders may have superior monitoring abilities to realign the manager's focus with the 
longer horizon. Because institutional owners have superior supervision and oversight over 
managerial actions, they are positioned to encourage managers to innovate in a value-maximizing 
manor. This view is similar to Aghion et al. (2013) who propose and test a career concerns model. 
The authors show support for managerial innovation due to career concerns associated with 
institutional ownership. Furthermore, after modeling the relationship between ownership and 
management, the authors can distinguish between the actions of a “career concerned” manager and 
a “lazy” manager.  
The empirical literature supports a robust theoretical and empirical relationship between managers, 
ownership, and innovation such as CEO overconfidence, (Hirshleifer et al. (2012); Galasso and 
Simcoe (2011)), executive hubris (Tang (2015)), or CEO-connections (Faleye (2014)). The 
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literature shows that adequately motivating a manger to innovation can lead to better innovation 
outcomes. For example, not only stimulating a manager to innovate, but also motivating a manager 
for a long-term growth perspective support positive innovation outcome: Manso (2011) and Ederer 
& Manso (2013). External factors, such as financial development, Hsu et al. (2014), or analysis 
coverage, He & Tian (2013), have been found to affect innovation output of firms also. 
Encouraging innovation is vital to the growth prospects of a firm. Fagerberg (2006) draws a 
distinction between invention as innovation "first occurrence of an idea for a new product or 
process, while innovation is the first attempt to carry it out into practice." For firms and society, 
innovation represents growth and advances. Whether growth is in technology, services, or a new 
process; firms benefit. Schumpeter (1942) is attributed to acknowledging the importance of 
innovation to businesses. However, Schumpeter is not alone in his conclusion based on the 
importance for firms to innovate, Baumol (2002). The primary reason firms’ as a whole peruse 
innovation is a method by which firms can increase their opportunities and grow their firms. For 
some, innovation can increase the likelihood of survival, Cefis & Marsili (2006), and for others, 
innovation is the most efficient way to drive growth, Coad & Rao (2008).  
Aghion et al. (2013) show that institutional investors increase the innovation output of firms. 
However, no prior study has investigated the knowledge-relatedness of subsequent innovation 
following the investment by institutional investors. Using a similar methodology to Aghion et al. 
(2013) we study how firm technological diversification changes after investment by institutional 
investors. Encouraging a firm to focus on value-enhancing innovation should lead to increased 
firm value in the long-run. The findings of Makri et al. (2006) highlight the importance of our 
study. The authors find that as technological intensity increases, effective incentives are focused 
more on increasing innovation resonance rather than only innovation quantity. As a manager, 
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increasing innovation may lead to an increased firm value; however, increasing both the amount 
and the focus on innovation may increase the firm value even higher. We believe our study is 
similar to that of Berger & Ofek (1995), who show that firms that overinvest and cross-subsidize 
innovation incur a value loss.  
2.3 Data 
We use firm-level data on institutional ownership and innovation from a variety of sources (See 
Appendix for more Information). For patent data, we use a novel new dataset that combines the 
known patent ownership information, as well as new firm-patent pairings. The data set is created 
by first combining three impactful patent datasets. The first two datasets combined are the NBER 
Patent data files match more than three million patents and associated assignees to U.S. firms for 
the period 1976 – 2006, the Kogan et al (2016) 1926-2010. By combining the two datasets we take 
advantage of the prior firm matching. To further identify patent owners, we use the ownership 
identification of Lai (2013). This new dataset uses Bayesian methods to match similar 
names/owners across patents over time.  
After matching all three prior datasets, we extend the data by matching patent names to firm 
subsidiary information available on EDGAR. Each publicly traded firm must list their subsidiaries 
in their 10-K annual filings; Exhibit 21 on EDGAR. Using the information on firm subsidiaries, 
we are able to extend the link between firms and patents beyond the year 2010. The firm subsidiary 
information provides matches in years prior to 2010 that were not previously available. 
The resulting data file allows us to match firm-level patent information to firm fundamental data 
from Compustat and Institutional ownership data from S&P Capital IQ. Compustat contains firm 
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fundamental data for all U.S. publicly listed firms. Compustat information relevant to this study 
includes; Total Assets, R&D, Sales, Capital Expenditure, Book Leverage, and the Number of 
Employees. 
The new dataset allows us to create new measures of technological change that will be discussed 
in Section 2.4. Our primary analysis is based on a text-based measure of patent similarity for a 
firm. 
For institutional ownership, we use S&P Capital IQ, which contains ownership data including the 
number of institutional investors, the number of shares issued, as well as the number of shares held 
by institutions. After combining all files, our sample includes 1,015 firms and over 11,000 firm 
years. Descriptive statistics for the baseline sample are documented in Table 2-1. Firms used in 
this study have an average institutional ownership of 36.8%. The average number of patents 
produced per firm-year is forty-eight; however, this is highly skewed, as the median is six. Table 
2-1 also includes summary statistics for several control variables employed in this study. 
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Table 2-1: Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Sd Min Max 
count_f 0.3015 1.1017 0.0000 31.0000 
inst_own 0.3680 0.2378 0.0000 1.0000 
rnd 0.0376 0.0763 0.0000 2.8443 
lat 6.1257 2.1983 -0.6218 13.5921 
lsale 6.1580 2.1191 -1.0217 12.4103 
capx 223.3620 902.4935 0.0000 29657.0000 
leverage 0.3175 0.3104 -14.8515 11.5709 
lemp 1.2166 1.9767 -6.9078 7.2442 
Table 2-1 displays descriptive statistics for the sample used in 
this study.  
 
The control variables selected for this study are Total Assets, R&D, Sales, Capital Expenditure, 
Book Leverage, and the Number of Employees. In our results, we measure Total Assets as the log 
transformation of total assets (lat), R&D as the percentage of R&D expenditures to total sales 
(R&D), Sales as the log transformation of sales (lsale), and the number of employees as the log 
transformation (lemp). We compute leverage as the firm's book leverage, short-term debt to total 
debt (leverage).  
The control variables selected are based on the findings of the prior literature. For example, Total 
Assets, a proxy for firm size, is associated with increased innovation. We expect Total Assets, 
R&D, Capital Expenditures, Book Leverage, the Number of Employees to have a positive impact 
on the change of future innovation and sales to have a negative impact on changing innovation. 
2.4 Technological Diversity 
2.4.1 Measuring Technological Diversity 
Many studies investigate the impact of institutional ownership on the future patent outcomes by 
measuring the simple count or citation weighted future patent outcomes. However, our study 
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examines how a firm's innovation changes, not in quantity but focus, as an investment by 
institutional investors. To measure the firms changing patent portfolio over time, we create three 
unique measures of patent portfolio diversification. Two measures are based on patent citations 
and classifications. The third is a novel approach is employing the text of patents to determine 
their similarity. Prior studies pass over the information contained in the text, in part because of its 
size; however, employing text as a measure of similarity has advantages over traditional measures. 
Each patent is issued a patent classification that measures the technical content of individual patent. 
There are several different classification schemes. In the United States, the two primary patent 
classifications are the International Patent Classification (IPC) and the United States Patent 
Classification (USPC). The International Patent Classification (IPC) is an internationally agreed 
upon standard used by over 100 countries. The United States Patent Classification (USPC) is 
determined and maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Each 
system classifies technology in a similar, but unique manner. Each measure classifies patents by 
assigning them a unique letter/number combination and many patents are assigned both a primary 
and secondary classification. An example of each classification method is included in Appendix 
C. 
Prior researchers have measures technology diversification using patent classification methods. 
One approach taken by several researchers is the approach of Jaffe (1986, 1989) who measures 
technological diversity by observing the distribution of patents over technology classes. Others 
have defined technological diversification in a different manner. Engelsman & Van Raan (1991, 
1992) and Verspagen (1997) take advantage of the difference between each primary and secondary 
technology class. Breschi et al. (2003) conduct a similar study using several unique variables that 
measure technological diversity. 
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We create two variables that capture the firms changing innovation focus over time. The first 
variable, Category_(i,t±3) measures the unique number categories a firm creates a patent in given 
it previous three years of patent history. For example, if a firm in the past three years has patented 
in the categories of food, and the firm then creates a patent in technology, this would increase the 
variable’s count by one. We generate this variable by creating a moving tally of patent classes a 
firm establishes a patent in for the past three years. Similarly, we create a score of all the firm's 
courses in the leading three years. After taking the inverse intersection of the two lists, we count 
the number of unique classes and define this as Category_(i,t±3). A more significant number 
indicates a firm that creates more “new” or unique innovation over time. We use both the USPTO’s 
United States Patent Classification (USPC) as well as the International Patent Classification (IPC) 
to show our results are not dependent upon the classification method. 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௜,௧±ଷ is defined as: 
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௜,௧±ଷ = |𝐵\𝐴| 
Where A = Set of all patent classifications in year [t-3,t) and, 
B = Set of all patent classifications in years [t, t+3) 
The next variable we use to capture a firm’s future patent outcome is New〖Technology〗_(t+1). 
This variable is defined as the number of patents applied for those that cite no previous firm patent. 
Most firms build on technology created previously. Even if a patent represents “new technology” 
it still is likely to cite or be the product of prior work. A patent that does not cite any prior work 
by a firm represents a systematic change in innovation for a firm. Therefore, a more significant 
number indicates that a firm creates patents in more technological classes any given year. 
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Both of these measures indicate how “diverse” or “focused” a firm’s innovation output is. Whereas 
most studies consider the effect of institutional ownership on innovation output, there has been no 
in-depth study on the firm's innovation focus. A more detailed description of the variables used in 
this study is included in Appendix A. 
2.4.2 Hypothesis Development 
With several measures for a firm’s patent portfolio, we can investigate the impact institutional 
investors on firm diversification, and subsequently diversification on firm value. The first 
hypothesis we propose is, 
H1: Greater institutional investor ownership increases the focus of a firm’s innovations. 
We investigate this hypothesis by regressing one of are alternative patent portfolio diversification 
measures on the percent institutional ownership as well as control variables. For this study, we 
follow the prior literature and include Sales, R&D, Total Assets, Capital Expenditures, and the 
Total Number of Employees as control variables. We argue the mechanism by which institutional 
investors’ decrease the diversification of a firm’s patent activity is through manager monitoring, 
similar to the model of Aghion et al. (2013). We show our results are robust to endogeneity 
concerns by employing instrumental variables, as well as regressions on subdivided populations. 
Next, we investigate the impact of reduced firm patent diversification on firm value with the 
following hypotheses,  
H2: Lower patent diversification increases firm value. 
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We study this hypothesis by regressing firm value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) on our unique patent 
diversification measure as well as control variables. Under the argument of Makri et al. (2006), a 
firm should consider the quality of innovation as well as their quantity to increase firm value. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Intuitional Ownership and Firm Innovation 
We expect the investment by institutional investors to increase a firm innovation focus. Because 
institutional investors have superior monitoring abilities and can better align manager incentives 
in the interest of shareholders, we believe as institutional holdings increase firms become more 
focused with their future innovations. 
The first investigation of institutional ownership on a firm’s patent focus is presented in Table 2-
2. Table two regresses the variable 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௜,௧±ଷ on institutional ownership and other control 
variables. To show our results are not subject to model specification, we attempt several model 
specifications. From left to right, our regressions include Poisson, negative binomial, OLS, and 
logit. Traditionally, citations and patent counts are assumed to be Poisson or negative binomial 
distributed. A negative and significant coefficient for 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௜,௧±ଷ would indicate firms focus 
their innovations as the percentage of institutional ownership increases.  
 
 
Table 2-2: Institutional Ownership and Innovation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial OLS OLS OLS 
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 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௧±ଷ 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௧±ଷ 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦) 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௧±ଷ 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
      
%inst_own -1.0922*** -0.9429*** -0.1859*** -0.4866*** -1.1508*** 
 (0.1992) (0.1755) (0.0336) (0.1032) (0.1966) 
      
rnd 1.2528** 1.6544*** 0.1807* 0.5134* 1.1890** 
 (0.3980) (0.4939) (0.0711) (0.2527) (0.3948) 
      
lat 0.3368*** 0.2486** 0.03803*** 0.1243*** 0.2297** 
 (0.0758) (0.0808) (0.0099) (0.0298) (0.0698) 
      
lsale -0.2568** -0.1264 -0.01258 -0.06819* -0.06633 
 (0.0880) (0.0957) (0.0131) (0.0338) (0.0928) 
      
capx 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
      
leverage 0.1562* 0.2578 0.02465 0.05799 0.1544 
 (0.0635) (0.1464) (0.0135) (0.0389) (0.0810) 
      
lemp 0.1764* 0.09626 0.01188 0.04101 0.08621 
 (0.0814) (0.0799) (0.0113) (0.0262) (0.0852) 
      
lnalpha  1.7198***    
  (0.0656)    
            
Year/Industry 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
N 11542 11542 11542 11542 11530 
 
The results of Table 2-2 are our baseline results; they document a negative and significant effect. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by firm. The results show that as 
institutional ownership increases, the firm’s innovation becomes more focused. Our findings are 
not sensitive to the specification. Additionally, parameter estimates remain relatively stable across 
all specifications. Our baseline (Poisson) specification shows that an increase in institutional 
ownership by five percent decreases the rate of new patent classifications in the preceding years 
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by approximatively 5%. In unreported results, changing the windows of 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௜,௧±ଷ by plus-
one or minus-one years does not change the parameter estimates in a meaningful way. 
It is possible our results are sensitive to the classification method used to create the variable, 
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௜,௧±ଷ. To alleviate this concern, we investigate our baseline results using an additional 
classification method. Our dependent variable 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௜,௧±ଷ is calculated in the same method as 
the previous results. However, to show our results hold we use 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௜,௧±ଷ calculated using the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) categories to determine the dependent variable. 
Compared to the USPC method the IPC method has approximately had a different method of 
subdivision.  If our results are not sensitive to the patent classification method, we should find our 
results are similar to those from Table 2-2.  
41 
 
 
Table 2-3: Institutional Ownership and Innovation (Text Based Measure) 
 
 Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial OLS OLS OLS 
 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௧±ଷ 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௧±ଷ 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦) 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௧±ଷ 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
      
inst_own -1.0358*** -0.9097*** -0.1878*** -0.4657*** -1.1508*** 
 (0.2067) (0.1945) (0.0375) (0.1001) (0.1966) 
      
rnd 1.4047** 1.4866** 0.2640* 0.9316* 1.1890** 
 (0.4314) (0.5269) (0.1126) (0.4727) (0.3948) 
      
lat 0.2686** 0.1951* 0.02964** 0.08895*** 0.2297** 
 (0.0863) (0.0816) (0.0101) (0.0268) (0.0698) 
      
lsale -0.1038 -0.05017 0.004339 -0.005169 -0.06633 
 (0.0934) (0.0936) (0.0122) (0.0291) (0.0928) 
      
capx 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
      
leverage -0.01583 0.1100 -0.01353 -0.1265 0.1544 
 (0.0743) (0.1022) (0.0271) (0.1218) (0.0810) 
      
lemp 0.1139 0.1017 0.006529 0.01885 0.08621 
 (0.0856) (0.0813) (0.0111) (0.0251) (0.0852) 
      
lnalpha  1.7622***    
  (0.0720)    
            
Year/Industry 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
N 10537 10537 10537 10537 11530 
 
 
 
42 
 
The results of Table 2-3 are very similar to those of Table 2-2. We find the same negative 
significant effect. Again, the results show that as institutional ownership increases, the firm’s 
innovation becomes more focused. The parameter estimates are not only stable across 
specifications but also similar in magnitude to those in Table 2-2. 
The results of Table 2-2 & 2-3 indicate that institutional ownership has a significant negative effect 
on a firm's future technological diversification. As the level of institutional ownership increases in 
a firm, the firms tend to focus their innovation in the preceding years. Next, we investigate if 
institutional ownership affects the firm’s creation of new technology, defined as technology not 
referenced by the firm prior. 
Our first measure of changing innovation could be dependent on the frequency of a firm’s patents. 
Furthermore, it may be dependent on the window we use to determine changing innovation. To 
alleviate these concerns, we employ a separate variable New〖Technology〗_(t+1) as the number 
of patents a firm creates absent of a citation of any of the firm’s previous patents. A larger number 
would indicate a firm that is creating patents that are unrelated to its previous patents.  
Using the dependent variable New〖Technology〗_(t+1) again look the impact of institutional 
ownership on firm innovation focus. The results are documented in Table 2-4.   
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Table 2-4: Institutional Ownership and New Patents 
 
 Probit Negative Binomial OLS Logit 
 _new _new ratio dummy 
     
inst_own -0.6008* -0.1065 -0.1439*** -1.1422 
 (0.2391) (0.1596) (0.0305) (0.6768) 
     
rnd 3.4061*** 4.6040*** -0.4017*** -3.6045* 
 (0.5425) (0.7010) (0.1050) (1.5231) 
     
lat 0.2076 0.6701*** -0.02821 -0.1023 
 (0.1305) (0.0790) (0.0144) (0.2203) 
     
lsale 0.7874*** 0.1322 0.002729 0.2556 
 (0.1823) (0.0965) (0.0188) (0.3630) 
     
capx -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0026** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0009) 
     
leverage 0.2694* -0.3076** -0.0003949 -0.08327 
 (0.1369) (0.1184) (0.0229) (0.3477) 
     
lemp -0.08476 0.02211 0.02054 0.3879 
 (0.1295) (0.0879) (0.0167) (0.3512) 
          
Year/Industry Controls YES YES YES YES 
N 5210 5210 5210 3459 
 
 
The results of Table 2-4 are consistent with our prior results, and they highlight a new level. The 
results indicate higher institutional ownership is associated with more focused innovation. All 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
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The results show the benefit institutional investors bring. Our results support the theory of prior 
literature. For example, Aghion et al. (2013) show institutional investors provide proper incentives 
to managers. Our results indicate that after the investment of institutional investors, firms 
innovation more in-line with their prior innovation. In the next section, we address the robustness 
of our results with regards to causality and selection bias. 
2.5.2 Institutional Ownership and Causality 
One issue with our prior analysis is the issue of causality. We find a significant relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm innovation. However, just as plagued other similar 
studies, we have said very little about the causal relationship between institutional ownership and 
firm innovation. In the following section, we include new test created to investigate the causal 
relationship between institutional ownership and innovation. The first set of tests includes 
regressing the measure of firm innovation on the change in institutional ownership. The second 
test uses a method similar to Aghion (2013). We use instrumental variables where the first stage 
regresses institutional ownership on membership in the S&P 500.   
In our first robustness test, we regress the change in technological areas on the change in 
institutional ownership. We compute the change in institutional ownership as (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛௧ −
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛௧ିଵ) ∗ 𝐼(ூ௡௦௧ை௪௡೟ିூ௡௦௧ை௪௡೟షభ)வ଴ where the indicator variable is equal to one when the 
change in institutional ownership is positive. We expect that if institutional owners are 
encouraging firms to become more focused on their innovation, the coefficient to be significant 
and negative. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 2-5.  
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Table 2-5: Change in Institutional Ownership 
 
 Negative Binomial OLS Poisson OLS 
 count_f l_count_f _new ratio 
     
Δ inst_own -0.0002*** -0.5757*** -0.0002** -0.0704*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0916) (0.0000) (0.0503) 
          
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year/Industry Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 11,542 11,542 5,210 5,210 
 
The results show that a significant negative relationship between technological diversification and 
institutional ownership. As firms experience greater institutional ownership, they decrease their 
future technological diversification.  
The prior analysis may be subject to endogeneity problems. In our analysis, institutional investors 
may choose more focused firms or firms with greater firm value. If this is the case, then naturally 
a higher level of institutional investors will look like it increases firm value, when in reality, 
institutional investors are following value. To alleviate this bias, we employ instrumental variables 
regression. For our instrument, we use membership in the S&P 500. The use of this instrument is 
similar to the analysis of Aghion et al. (2013). The inclusion of a firm in the S&P 500 may increase 
the likelihood a firm is owned by an institutional investor for several reasons. 1) The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act and other fiduciary duty measures have been shown to influence 
portfolio section through an implied endorsement of broad indexing. 2) Additionally, many funds 
are benchmarked or indexed to the S&P 500 which either requires or encourages them to invest in 
the fund. 3) Furthermore, inclusion in the S&P 500 is not influenced by the company and inclusion 
is based on sector restrictions, not firm preference. Because firms have no choice as to their 
inclusion or exclusion from the index, the variable is semi-random. 
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In the first stage, we regress institutional ownership on the membership in the S&P 500. Next, we 
used our technological diversification measures on predicted ownership. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Table 2-6. 
 
Table 2-6: IV Regression using S&P 500 
 
 First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Unique Class Institutional 
Ownership 
Unique Patent 
     
inst_own  -0.5757***  -0.0708** 
  (0.0916)  (0.0503) 
     
S&P 500 0.1373***  0.2022***  
 (0.0053)   (0.0073)  
          
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year/Industry Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 11,542 11,542 5,210 5,210 
 
Column (1) and Column (3) represent the regression of institutional ownership on membership in 
the S&P 500. As expected each shows a positive relationship, indicating firms in the S&P 500 are 
more likely to have higher institutional ownership. In both regressions the magnitude of this effect 
is similar. In the second stage, we regress new technological diversification on the predicted 
institutional ownership from the first stage. This reduces the bias introduced by endogeneity 
problems. The relationship between predicted institutional ownership and patent uniqueness is 
negative across both our control variable and our new measure of diversification. The results 
support the relationship between institutional ownership and new technological diversification.  
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2.5.3 Additional Results 
Prior results confirm that institutional investors increase the focus of a firm’s innovation. We show 
our results are robust to endogeneity issues as well as the specification of firm innovation. In the 
next section, we will demonstrate that a firm’s technological diversification affects its firm value. 
We draw parallels to the infamous “Diversification Discount.”  
Early research by Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Servaes (1996) show that 
diversified firms trade at a discount relative to their less diversified peers. Later studies, such as 
Villalonga (2004), suggest that the diversification discount is a symptom of measurement 
specification. Our research is similar to previous studies; however, as an alternative to the 
diversification of firm production as measured by the previously cited studies, we look at the 
diversification of firm innovation activities.  
If a firm produces overly diverse new technology, they may be inefficiently allocating capital 
amounts their R&D divisions. In this case, a firm that creates patents that are of little value to the 
firm is inefficiently allocating capital. Whereas, a firm producing meaningful innovation, highly 
related to the firm’s prior products is assumed to be more efficient. 
To investigate this relationship, we employ both the measures of firm diversification from the 
previous section as well as firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. We compute Tobin’s Q as the 
total market value of the firm divided by the firm’s total assets. When a firm becomes more focused 
in their innovation, they increase their firm value over time, thereby increasing the firms Tobin’s 
Q. 
In Table 2-7 we investigate the impact of a firm changing patent portfolio on firm value. To ensure 
that firms that have large diversified segments do not drive the results, we subdivide the sample 
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into three groups. High, medium, and low patent activity. The High patent activity group is defined 
as those firms that produce patents in the upper 30th percentile of all firms. Similarly, the low 
patent activity group is defined as those in the lower 30th percentile of all firms. All remaining 
firms are placed in the medium patent activity group. By subdividing our sample, we can determine 
if the effect of focusing a firm’s innovation is consistent across firms with different levels of patent 
activity. Based on our hypothesis, we would expect a negative relationship between our text-based 
measure of patent originality, and firm value. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2-
7. 
 
Table 2-7: Impact of Innovation on Different Firm Sizes 
    
  Text Diversity Tobin's Q 
Panel A: Sorted by Patent Activity      
High Activity (> 70th Percentile, n = 2,893) 
    
inst_own  -0.2729*  
  (0.1070)  
    
Text Diversity   -0.0024* 
   (0.0017) 
    
Mid Activity (30th - 70th Percentile, n = 3,858) 
    
inst_own  -1.2398***  
  (0.3070)  
    
Text Diversity   -0.0024** 
   (0.0013) 
    
Low Activity (< 30th Percentile, n = 2,640) 
    
inst_own  -0.7831***  
  (0.4123)  
    
Text Diversity   -1.2398*** 
   (.1212) 
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Table 2-7 divides the sample firms into three groups of high, medium, and low patent activity. 
Across all groups, institutional ownership seems to focus firms patenting activities. This effect is 
significant at the ten percent level across all groups. For the medium and low patent activity groups, 
the impact is significant at the one percent level.  
The effect seems to be the greatest for the medium and low patent activity groups, where the high 
activity group sees the smallest impact. This may be due to monitoring costs associated with large 
firms.  As described in the prior section, the primary method by which institutional investors affect 
innovation is through monitoring. In a large or highly diversified corporation, supervision by an 
institutional investor may become more costly and expensive. Ultimately, our results show that 
institutional ownership reduces a firm’s diversity making them more focused over time. 
In the second column of Table 2-7 we investigate the impact of a firm’s technological 
diversification, using our unique text-based measure of patent originality, on firm value, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q.  Again, we look at the impact of changing technological diversity using 
three groups of patent activity.  The results indicate a negative relationship between patent 
originality and firm value. As patent originality increase, the firm value decreases. The stated effect 
remains consistent across all patent activity groups. More notably, the results are highly significant 
for the low patent activity group. This may indicate that our results are not being driven by large 
firms with large patent portfolios. Firms that produce few patents also receive a benefit from 
focusing their patent portfolio. 
These results are consistent with the results of Makri et al. (2006). Increasing firm value using 
patenting activity should consist of focusing on more than the number of patents produced. In fact, 
50 
 
our results show that it is the types of patents that are created that also lead to changing firm value. 
Quality and quantity lead to higher firm value over time. It seems as though institutional investors 
increase both patent quantity and quality. 
The final analysis considers both Hypothesis 1 & 2. Does institutional ownership lead to a firm 
focusing their patent portfolio, which ultimately increases firm value? The results have shown each 
independent component of this, however, to control for endogeneity, we use three-stage least 
squares (3SLS). In the first equation, we estimate the predicted institutional ownership given 
inclusion in the S&P 500 index. This is similar to the IV regression in the previous section. The 
second equation uses the predicted institutional ownership to find the predicted patent portfolio 
diversity. Lastly, using the predicted patent diversification, we investigate the impact on firm 
value.   
We use both 3SLS and seemingly unrelated regression or SUR. First, to ensure that the S&P is not 
correlated with the firm value in our sample, we test the means of both a group of firms included 
in the S&P and a group excluded from the S&P 500. We find the result insignificant indicating 
that our sample is balanced and Tobin's Q and S&P members are not strongly correlated. The 
results are reported in Table 2-8.  
The results in Table 2-8 are in line with expectations. As a firm becomes included in the S&P 500, 
they are more likely to be held by institutional investors. Furthermore, the increase in institutional 
investors focuses firm innovation and that focus in innovation is associated with an increase in 
firm value. The results hold for both estimation methods. 
 
 
Table 2-8: Three Stage Least Squares 
 
        
Panel A: Sample Balance               
        
 
Not Included 
in S&P 
Included in 
S&P 
Two Tail T-test 
(P-value)    
Mean Tobin's Q 1.8546 1.8953 (0.1344)    
N 19,182 10,737      
        
Panel B: Three Stage Least Squares               
        
 Estimation Method: 3SLS  Estimation Method: SURE 
        
 First Stage Second Stage Third Stage  First Stage Second Stage Third Stage 
Dependent Variable: 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Text 
Originality Tobin's Q  
Institutional 
Ownership 
Text 
Originality Tobin's Q 
        
Patent_Portfolio   0.7605***    0.1593** 
   (0.0627)    (0.0700) 
        
inst_own  -2.4446***    -1.1931***  
  (0.1285)    (0.0441)  
        
S&P 500 0.1979***    0.1963***   
 (0.0031)    (0.0031)   
                
 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
We investigate the relationship between technological diversification and institutional ownership. 
We measure technological diversification using unique methods determined by patent 
classifications and by using the text of patents. Using the text of patents allows a researcher to 
capture variation within patent classes, and provides greater flexibility over tradition measures. 
Our results show strong statistical support indicating that increases in institutional ownership lead 
to more focused, less diversified innovation. 
As majority owners, institutional investors have the ability to increase monitoring and pressure 
managers to increase the value of a firm. Because innovation is a value-enhancing activity, it can 
be used as a value-enhancing signal. However, prior studies only consider the quantity of 
innovation, not the type of innovation. Our research shows the impact of institutional investors on 
the technological diversification of a firm’s innovation.  
If managers can incentivize firms to increase the value, or in the terms of Makri et al. (2006), the 
resonance, or quality, of their innovation, future innovation will be more impactful. The results of 
our study show that institutional investors encourage firms to increase the resonance of their 
innovation. Our results, as well as the results of prior studies, support the view of institutional 
investors being value enhancers. 
Our results have implications for ownership structure as we show that institutional investors have 
an impact on the future innovation of a firm. Additionally, our results reveal a mechanism by which 
institutional investors add value to a firm by focusing their innovation. The conclusions of our 
study support value the enhancing the role of institutional investors documented in Cornett (2007), 
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Maury & Pajuste (2005), and Elyasiani & Jia (2010), among others. Our adds to the growing 
collection of the impact institutional investors have on firm value. 
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Appendix A: Patent Data 
Patent data can be grouped into two primary generations. The first lead by the work of Schmookler 
(1966), Scherer (1982), and Griliches (1984), hand collected and hand matched patents to their 
owners. Furthermore, they relied on a simple patent count to measure a firms innovation activity. 
The second and most recent generation is led by the work of Trajtenberg, Jaffe, and Henderson 
(1997) and Kogan et al. (2016). These researchers used publicly available data to match patents to 
their corresponding firms using technology. When combined, the previous data spans from nearly 
seventy years, 1926-2010, and has made a meaningful impact on innovation research.  
In this paper, we propose a third generation of patent data. The third generation of patent data has 
two distinct contributions. First, it extends patent-firm ownership information beyond 2010 to 
2016. The new dataset used the already discovered connections between prior datasets and 
additionally data on firm names. The second contribution of this dataset is the available to use the 
text information of patents. Previous studies have relied on patent counts, citations, or patent 
classes to define the nature and value of a patent. However, few studies have unlocked the data 
available in a patents text. The new dataset allows for the use of the text data. We also provide an 
example variable and test study. 
The appendix provides more detail on the collection and transformation of the new dataset. This 
information is technical and may provide the reader with a clear picture of how the data is 
manipulated. 
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1. Data Collection 
1.1 Patent Data 
We gather the full text of all U.S. utility patents granted from 1926 to 2010 from the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO). All patent information collected is publicly available information 
and contained in the USPTO’s bulk data files4. The bulk data files are divided into several different 
file formats, with data before 1975 in PDF format. While data is available from 1975 or earlier, 
the text is scanned using an Optical character recognition process and is extremely unreliable and 
unstructured. Previous researchers have used data pre-1975, such as Packalen and Bhattacharya 
(2012). However, we find the reliability of the character recognition to be substandard. For patents 
granted after 1975, we write a python script to filter and sort the data into a malleable database. 
We collect the relevant sections of this study. They include: The Patent Number, Application Date, 
Award Date, Inventor, Assignee, References Cited, Abstract, Claims, and Description. The final 
sample comprises 4,131,597 patents. 
1.2. Firm Ownership Information 
Matching firms to their owners is no simple task. Several problems arise when trying to discern 
the ownership of any specific patent. For example, some firm names have several variations. 
International Business Machines may be listed in numerous ways, such as IBM, Inter Business 
Machine, among others. Over time, more data has been gathered that can aid in the process of 
ownership matching. The literature of Kogan et al. (2016) and Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) 
have made substantial upgrades to the link between firms and their patents. This dataset uses the 
knowledge of the previous datasets. 
                                                 
4 https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/bulk-data-products  
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To extend the data beyond the previous datasets, we employ a novel approach, matching firms to 
their subsidiaries. Firms can assign patents to their parent firm, or any one of their listed 
subsidiaries. Each publicly traded firm must list their subsidiaries in their 10-K annual filings, 
Exhibit 21 on EDGAR. Using the information on firm subsidiaries, we are able to extend the link 
between firms and patents beyond the year 2010. Furthermore, the firm subsidiary information 
provides matches in years before 2010 that were not previously available.5  
First, we gather the developed firm-patent data sets provided by Kogan et al. (2016), and the NBER 
patent database of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). The Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) 
dataset links patents to firms for the years 1976-2006. The Kogan et al. (2016) dataset links patent 
ownership to firms from 1926-2010. By combining the two datasets, we take advantage of the 
prior firm matching. To further identify patent owners, we use the ownership identification of Lai 
(2013). This dataset using Bayesian methods to match similar names/owners across patents over 
time. Each dataset contains matches that are unique to each dataset. 
Now we combine the resulting dataset with the new matches from the Exhibit 21 files. Names 
from the Exhibit 21 are cleaned and standardized according to the NBER name standardization 
routine. In summary, the process involves normalizing the text, including the company suffixes, 
and removing all punctuation. The routine then tries to find all perfect matches between the patent 
datafiles and the EDGAR files. After an initial match, a secondary match is performed after further 
cleaning of the names is performed.6 
  
                                                 
5 More information on Exhibit 21 can be found here: https://www.sec.gov/oiea/Article/edgarguide.html  
6 A Stata version of the name standardization routine can be found here: 
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/posts/namestandardizationroutinesuploaded  
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2. Data Processing and Cosign Similarity 
 
Each data source is gathered, the data need to be processed and converted into qualitative data. 
The processing of data happens in five general steps: 
 
1. Collect - Gather the data from the USPTO. 
2. Pre-process - Process each file to gather macro information (Name, Application Year, etc.) 
as well as patent Description, Abstract, and Claims. 
3. Process - Process the text data including cleaning "stop" words and other text that does not 
contain information. 
4. Ownership Identification - Matching patents to firm ownership. 
5. Variable Creation - Using the processed text to create variables of interest. 
 
The pre-processing stage involves extracting information from the USPTO bulk patent data files. 
Variables of interest are captured as well as text from the various sections of the patents During 
the Process stage; the text is cleaned of punctuation and only phrases made up of only uncapitalized 
English nouns. We also remove all words lacking information content, stop words. Stop words are 
devoid of any informational material (such as: and, it, or) and therefore contribute very little to the 
understanding of similarities between two documents. The cleaning process is similar to prior 
literature.  
During the process state, the remaining text (referred to as tokenized) is converted into count 
vectors of n length (where n refers to the number of unique words). Each input in the vector 
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corresponds to the count of a unique word. These vectors are referred to as term vectors. Each 
vector is then normalized to one. 
Given any two vectors (or documents) one can compute the similarity between them using cosign 
similarity. The cosign similarity or cosign distance refers to the distance between two vectors. 
Given two non-zero vectors, one can compute the cosign similarity using the dot product of each 
term vector. 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = ஺∙஻
ห|஺|ห||஻||
  
Where A and B refer to the non-zero term frequency vector. 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Definition of Variables 
Variables  Definition Source 
Panel A. Institutional Ownership   
Inst. Own% Total institutional ownership as a fraction of shares outstanding   
Max. Inst. Own% Percentage of shares outstanding held by the firm’s largest institution   
Top 5 Own Percentage of shares outstanding held by a firm’s top 5 institutional investors   
Top 10 Own Percentage of shares outstanding held by a firm’s top 10 institutional investors   
Top Block Hold. Percentage of shares outstanding held by a firm’s institutional investors whose holdings are greater than 5%   
   
Panel B. Patent Variables   
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦௜,௧±ଷ 
The number of unique categories a firm creates a patent in given it previous three years of patent 
history NBER Patent Data 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦௧ାଵ The number of patents a firm creates absent of a citation of any of the firm’s previous patents NBER Patent Data 
   
Panel C. Control Variables   
Book Leverage Long-term debt divided by book value of assets  COMPUSTAT 
Log(TotalAsset) Log transformation of total assets COMPUSTAT 
R&D 
 
Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization  
divided by book value of assets 
COMPUSTAT 
Log(Sales) Log transformation of firm i’s sales. COMPUSTAT 
Tobin's Q  Market value of assets divided by book value of assets COMPUSTAT 
Log(FirmAge) Log transformation of firm age COMPUSTAT 
HHI Index Herfindahl index based on the firm's sales in a given 4-digit SIC industry. COMPUSTAT 
CAPX Capital expenditure of firm i in year t. COMPUSTAT 
Log(#Emp) Log(1 + # of employees) for firm i in year t. COMPUSTAT 
S&P500 Binary variable if the firm is in S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise S&PCapital IQ Database 
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Appendix C: Patent Classification Methods 
USPC Classification Example (002-030) IPC Classification Example 
Class 
Number Class Title Class Identifier Class Title 
002 Apparel A01 
AGRICULTURE; FORESTRY; ANIMAL HUSBANDRY; 
HUNTING; TRAPPING; FISHING 
004 Baths, closets, sinks, and spittoons A21 
BAKING; EQUIPMENT FOR MAKING OR PROCESSING 
DOUGHS; DOUGHS FOR BAKING 
005 Beds A22 
BUTCHERING; MEAT TREATMENT; PROCESSING 
POULTRY OR FISH 
007 Compound tools A23 
FOODS OR FOODSTUFFS; THEIR TREATMENT, NOT 
COVERED BY OTHER CLASSES 
008 Bleaching and dyeing A24 
TOBACCO; CIGARS; CIGARETTES; SMOKERS' 
REQUISITES 
 012 Boot and shoe making  PERSONAL OR DOMESTIC ARTICLES 
014 Bridges A41 WEARING APPAREL 
015 Brushing, scrubbing, and general cleaning A42 HEADWEAR 
016 Miscellaneous hardware A43 FOOTWEAR 
019 Textiles: fiber preparation A44 HABERDASHERY; JEWELLERY 
023 Chemistry: physical processes A45 HAND OR TRAVELLING ARTICLES 
024 Buckles, buttons, clasps, etc. A46 BRUSHWARE 
026 Textiles: cloth finishing A61 MEDICAL OR VETERINARY SCIENCE; HYGIENE 
027 Undertaking A62 LIFE-SAVING; FIRE-FIGHTING 
028 Textiles: manufacturing A63 SPORTS; GAMES; AMUSEMENTS 
029 Metal working   
030 Cutlery   
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